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Abstract 
 
To seek compliance with rules and laws, regulatory authorities are usually in a position of 
power over a heterogeneous population or multiple groups. Power may thus need to be 
analysed as a tripartite relationship between authority, ingroup and outgroup. Based on the 
social identity approach and related justice theories, it is argued that social identification 
with an inclusive category that includes ingroup, outgroup and authority determines how 
group members react to the authority’s power use and how legitimate they find the 
authority. Two studies were set in the context of the Australian tax system, an experimental 
study with a student sample and a survey with a random sample of Australian citizens. 
Results were consistent with the theoretical analysis. Participants who identified less 
strongly with the inclusive category (Australians) attributed more legitimacy to the tax 
authority, when it exercised effective power over the outgroup (Study 1), or when it 
appeared lenient towards the ingroup (Study 2). In contrast, participants who identified 
strongly with the inclusive category attributed more legitimacy to the tax authority when it 
used its powers consistently towards both groups. 
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Legitimacy of regulatory authorities as a function of inclusive identification and 
power over ingroups and outgroups 
 
Michael Wenzel1 and Prita Jobling2 
 
In most spheres of society, laws, rules or principles regulate human conduct, usually to 
maintain social order, to advance the collective good or to protect individual rights and 
welfare. Regulatory institutions are agencies that monitor and seek to maintain compliance 
with such rules or principles. To give some examples, obviously the courts and the police 
attempt to keep the public compliant with all forms of laws: criminal law, traffic rules and 
so on. There are also institutions that attempt to maintain principles of free and fair markets 
(for example, in Australia the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission). 
Likewise, there are revenue agencies such as the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) 
whose responsibility it is to ensure that people pay the taxes they lawfully owe.  
 
Regulatory institutions may have various strategies to seek compliance, but conventionally 
they use their ability to punish and sanction in order to coerce people into certain 
behaviour. The ability to coerce others is usually the short definition of the concept of 
power (see Haslam, 2004). Regulatory institutions have power, and it is the use of their 
power that is often subject to evaluation and scrutiny. As Malcolm Sparrow (2000) puts it 
forcefully:  
 
Society entrusts regulatory and enforcement agencies with awesome powers. They 
can impose economic penalties, place liens upon or seize property, limit business 
practices, suspend professional licences, destroy livelihoods. They can restrict 
liberty, use force, and even kill […] How regulatory and enforcement agencies use 
these powers fundamentally affects the nature and quality of life in a democracy. 
Not surprisingly, regulators are scrutinised more closely and criticised more 
regularly for their uses or abuses of power than for their stewardship of public 
resources (Sparrow, 2000, p. 2). 
 
For the functioning of regulatory institutions and the effectiveness of any other 
powerholder, it is important to realise that power does not simply and automatically lead to 
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submission and compliance of the regulated or the powerless. Rather, reactions to power 
are very much determined by people’s perception of how powerholders use or abuse their 
power (see Lee-Chai & Bargh, 2001). In this paper, we argue that people attribute more or 
less legitimacy to a powerholder depending on the level and consistency of the power used 
and people’s sense of social identity shared with the powerholder. 
 
Power and legitimacy 
 
Definitions of power vary in the social psychological literature and include broader and 
narrower conceptions (see Turner, 2005). In their classic article, French and Raven (1959) 
understand power broadly as the potential to influence other people’s attitudes or 
behaviour. This potential can be based on one’s capability to reward or punish others, 
one’s legitimate authority, expertise, attraction and, as Raven adds (1965; 2001), 
information and persuasion. In contrast, Moscovici (1976) distinguishes between power 
and influence: power involves dependence and means coercion against people’s will and 
beliefs, whereas influence operates through norms and social consensus that change 
people’s very will and beliefs (see also Hollander, 1985; Turner, 1991). Legitimacy, 
expertise, attraction and information are, from this perspective, only effective in changing 
others’ behaviour if they are socially validated through processes of social influence 
(Haslam, 2004). Power more narrowly defined is thus restricted to the ‘relative capacity to 
modify others’ states by providing or withholding resources or administering punishments’ 
(Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003, p. 265).  
 
However, as Turner (2005) argues, even the meaning of rewards and sanctions (and other 
forms of control, including physical constraints and force) varies depending on the 
influence processes that underlie them. On the one hand, they can be considered legitimate 
means of control bestowed on an authority through influence, consensus and group norms. 
On the other hand, they can be considered means of mere coercion - enforcement against 
one’s will and without legitimacy. Compliance with an authority is voluntary, whereas 
coerced compliance is involuntary. In turn, use of coercive power can undermine the 
psychological basis of social influence, such as social identification and perceived 
legitimacy (Haslam, 2004; Reynolds & Platow, 2003; Turner, 2005). It depends on a 
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powerholder’s fair and ethical use of its powers whether or not he/she maintains or attains 
a position of legitimate authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992).  
 
Evaluations of power use and their effects on perceptions of legitimacy are particularly 
important for regulatory institutions because, while they have power to coerce people to 
follow certain rules, coercion is not the most efficient way of regulating behaviour. For 
one, deterrence (that is, the threat of sanctions for noncompliance as a means to seek 
compliance) requires constant surveillance of behaviour. Once surveillance ceases, 
deterrence is likely to be ineffective. Second, systems of control and the administration of 
sanctions can be costly. Regulators need to gather evidence and establish a case against a 
suspected noncomplier, allow for appeal processes, arrange for court hearings and so on. 
Therefore, as Tyler (2001) argues, regulatory authorities would be better off seeking 
voluntary compliance, the key to which is the perceived legitimacy of the authority and the 
rules it attempts to maintain. Legitimacy implies a sense of obligation and thus willingness 
to obey authorities and follow the social rules. However, if a regulator is perceived to 
exercise excessive levels of power or to abuse their power otherwise, this can undermine 
its perceived legitimacy and lead to resistance and protest behaviour (often manifested in 
noncompliance). It is therefore important to understand the processes and conditions that 
lead people to accept the use of power, to ascribe legitimacy to a powerholder and to obey 
its decisions willingly. 
 
Power and social identity 
 
Recent research from the perspectives of social identity and self-categorisation theories has 
contributed to an understanding of these processes. The main argument is that subordinates 
interpret and evaluate power use very much through the lens of their salient group 
membership. That is, their interpretation and evaluation of power use depends on whether 
the powerholder is perceived to be an ingroup or outgroup member.  
 
For instance, Ellemers, Van Rijswijk, Bruins and De Gilder (1998) experimentally 
manipulated the level of power a superior exerted as well as the ingroup versus outgroup 
membership of the superior. Generally, subordinates were less satisfied and ascribed less 
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legitimacy when the level of power was high compared to low. However, subordinates 
who identified strongly with their ingroup attributed the power use of the ingroup superior 
more benevolently to external circumstances than less identified subordinates did. On a 
subsequent task participants cooperated with an ingroup superior regardless of whether the 
level of power was high or low. In contrast, subordinates cooperated less with an outgroup 
superior who exerted high levels of power than in the case of low power.  
 
A study by Haslam, McGarty and Reynolds (1999; reported in Haslam, 2004) told a very 
similar story. Here, in a vignette study Australian participants learned about students 
seeking help from authorities after their passports had been stolen. The students were either 
Australians seeking help from American immigration officials, or Americans seeking help 
from Australian officials. When the officials dealt with the problem only slowly, this was 
considered more legitimate when they were Australians (ingroup) compared to when they 
were Americans (outgroup) dealing with Australian students. The results are consistent 
with a social identity analysis. Subordinate group members will evaluate an ingroup 
superior more favourably than an outgroup superior, when they identify with their group. 
Restated in terms of self-categorisation theory (Haslam, 2004), once a powerholder is 
categorised as a member of their ingroup, subordinates will consider them as more 
representative of their group and as more normative and persuasive. Power is basically 
transformed into legitimate influence. 
 
However, even when subordinates perceive the powerholder as being part of their ingroup, 
ascription of legitimacy should further depend on whether the powerholder lives up to the 
expectation of representing the values of the group (Turner, 1991) and, for example, 
maintaining principles of procedural fairness (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Group members who 
identify with the group that an authority is meant to represent want the authority to treat 
them with respect, benevolence and neutrality; and they ascribe greater legitimacy to an 
ingroup authority who acts in accordance with such principles of procedural fairness 
(Tyler, 1997). 
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Power as a tripartite relationship 
 
In most research, including the studies reviewed in the previous section, power has been 
treated as a relationship between two parties: one powerholder and one subordinate party 
(for example, one individual with power over another individual, one group over another 
group, or one authority over a presumably homogeneous group of subordinates). When 
ingroup/outgroup relations were considered this usually referred to the question of whether 
subordinates and powerholder belonged to the same group, or subordinates belonged to 
one group and the powerholder to another group.  
 
However, in the context of regulatory institutions it becomes apparent that the power 
relation can rather be construed as a tripartite (or multipartite) one, with an authority 
exercising power over two (or more) different societal groups. For instance, the police or 
the courts are often in a relationship of authority over two conflicting parties. Likewise, 
institutions such as tax authorities have power over a population of taxpayers that is not 
homogeneous, but consists of different societal groups; for instance, the rich versus the 
poor, businesses owners versus wage and salary earners, and so on. 
 
That means, in the context of taxation for instance, people can think of themselves as 
members of a certain sublevel ingroup of taxpayers, in contrast to one or more other groups 
(outgroups) of taxpayers. They then regard the authority as having certain powers over 
their ingroup and certain powers over the outgroup. By implication, the two subgroups can 
compare themselves with each other in terms of their level of powerlessness towards the 
authority. As will be argued here, this adds another dimension to the issue of how people 
perceive and react to an authority’s position of power; namely the issue of consistency of 
power over different groups of subordinates. 
 
Some recent research has indeed looked at the power of authorities that preside over a 
diverse group or over different groups. Smith and Tyler (1996), for example, studied 
factors that led advantaged and disadvantaged ethnic groups in America to ascribe 
legitimacy to Congress and its policies. They found that members of both groups granted 
greater levels of legitimacy to the authority when they identified strongly with the 
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superordinate group Americans and they felt Congress was fair and respectful in its 
decision-making processes. In contrast, subgroup members who identified less strongly 
with the superordinate group Americans appeared more instrumentally motivated and 
evaluated legitimacy rather as a function of how favourable Congress’ decisions were for 
their subgroup (for similar findings in different settings, see Huo, 2003; Huo, Smith, Tyler, 
& Lind, 1996).  
 
However, while the situation in these studies involved one authority wielding power over 
different groups of subordinates, a tripartite power relation was not the research focus. The 
authority’s level of power over different groups was not the explicit subject of the studies; 
neither did subgroups compare their respective positions of power or powerlessness vis-à-
vis the authority. Perceptions of fairness, furthermore, concerned the authority’s general 
processes of decision-making, not its relative treatment of different subgroups. 
Nonetheless, consistent with the group value model of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 
1988; Tyler, 1997), these studies yielded two important insights that are also important for 
responses to power in a tripartite relation, as we will see now: a superordinate or inclusive 
group identity may be considered to encompass subgroups and authority, and this may 
increase the tendency to respond to the perceived fairness, rather than the subgroup 
favourability, of power use or power distribution.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
The question addressed in this paper is when and why subordinates in a tripartite power 
relation ascribe legitimacy to the powerholder. As the studies by Ellemers et al. (1998) and 
Haslam et al. (1999) have shown, power use seems to be more acceptable and regarded as 
more legitimate when the powerholder is considered to be part of the ingroup. How does 
this analysis now translate to the situation of a tripartite power relation where a 
powerholder, a third party, wields power over both ingroup and outgroup? The key is that 
self-categorisations are possible at different levels of inclusiveness (Turner, 1987), and the 
powerholder can be considered a member and representative of a more inclusive self-
category that includes ingroup and outgroup (Huo, 2003). If this is the case and 
subordinates identify strongly with the inclusive category, then (following Ellemers et al., 
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1998, and Haslam et al., 1999) the powerholder is likely to be evaluated relatively 
favourably and to be considered legitimate regardless of the level of power used. In 
contrast, when subordinates do not identify with the relevant inclusive category, they will 
evaluate power use more in terms of its impact on their ingroup’s interests and relative 
outcomes. That is, subordinates who identify less strongly with the inclusive category will 
ascribe greater legitimacy to a powerholder who uses less power and is more lenient 
towards their sublevel ingroup, than to a powerholder who uses greater powers against 
their ingroup (Hypothesis 1a). Alternatively, subordinates who identify less strongly with 
the inclusive category will (again, out of group interest) ascribe greater legitimacy to a 
powerholder who uses greater powers against the outgroup, than to a powerholder who is 
lenient or powerless against the outgroup (Hypothesis 1b). 
 
This prediction so far refers to the effects of power level. However, the tripartite situation 
may involve a powerholder who has different levels of power over different subgroups. 
What are the implications of such inconsistency of power use? First, consistency of power 
use can be construed as an issue of procedural fairness (Leventhal, 1980), and as such we 
can derive predictions from Tyler’s group value model of procedural justice that links the 
fairness motive to social identity (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler, 
Boeckmann, Smith & Huo, 1997). Specifically, Tyler assumes that people seek 
procedurally fair treatment when they identify with the (inclusive) group represented by a 
decision-maker or authority, because the fair treatment reflects their value or standing in 
the group. Identified with the group, people are concerned about their status as members of 
that group and thus want to be treated fairly and respectfully by the authority representing 
the group. 
 
Alternatively, consistency of power use can be construed as an issue of distributive justice, 
because power use has usually direct material consequences for subordinates. In a social 
categorisation approach to distributive justice, Wenzel (2004) argues that people derive 
entitlements from a more inclusive category that includes all potential recipients in a given 
situation. The entitlements are derived either directly from one’s membership in that 
category or from one’s relative prototypicality for the category. For instance, when highly 
identified with the relevant inclusive category, people may derive from this inclusion an 
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entitlement to be treated the same as other members (or subgroups) of that category 
(Wenzel, 2000). The implications are the same as for Tyler’s analysis. Subordinates who 
identify with the superordinate category that includes ingroup, outgroup and the authority 
will be more strongly motivated towards just and consistent treatment. As a consequence, 
subordinates will ascribe greater legitimacy to a powerholder who shows consistency of 
power use across ingroup and outgroup. Conversely, subordinates who do not identify with 
the inclusive category will be less motivated towards justice. Their perceptions will not be 
affected by the level of consistency of power use (Hypothesis 2).  
 
To summarise, subordinates who identify to a lesser degree with a group that includes 
powerholder and sublevel ingroup and outgroup will be more concerned about self or 
group interests (Smith & Tyler, 1996; Wenzel, 2002a). They will ascribe greater 
legitimacy to a powerholder who uses little power over the ingroup or much power over 
the outgroup. In contrast, those highly identified with the inclusive category will be 
committed to justice and fairness. They will attribute greater legitimacy to a powerholder 
who uses power consistently.  
 
Study 1 
 
The present research is set in the context of taxation, with the tax authority as powerholder 
and different taxpayer groups as the regulated subgroups. In Study 1, the two relevant 
groups were cash-earning low income taxpayers versus wealthy corporate taxpayers. 
Participants were psychology students who are usually on low income and often have side 
jobs where they are paid in cash. It was thus assumed they would refer to the cash-earning 
low income taxpayers more as an ingroup and to wealthy taxpayers as an outgroup. The 
nation (that is, Australians) was in this context likely to be a relevant inclusive 
superordinate category (including ingroup, outgroup and tax authority). Power referred 
here to the Tax Office’s capacity to enforce compliance of the ingroup and outgroup, 
respectively, and was portrayed as being either low or high. The consistency of power use 
was therefore implied in this design and was greater when the tax authority had 
presumably either little power over both taxpayer groups or great powers over both groups. 
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Method 
 
Participants and design. The participants were 106 undergraduate psychology students 
between 18 and 54 years old (M = 24). The vast majority of them (95.3%) earned taxable 
income at the time or had done so in the past (even though their total income may have 
been below the tax-free threshold). The participants were randomly allocated to the 
conditions of a 2(power over ingroup) x 2(power over outgroup) experimental design. The 
main dependent measure was the level of legitimacy attributed to the Tax Office. 
 
Materials. Bogus newspaper articles about the Tax Office were created for the purposes of 
the study. Elements of real newspaper articles were tailored and combined to fit the 
required state of affairs for each condition. Arguments were kept consistent across 
conditions, such that only power use differed, while the content of the stories was the 
same. An approximately equal number of words was dedicated to ingroup and outgroup 
arguments within each article.  
 
The articles portrayed the power of the Tax Office as either high or low over two sectors of 
society, cash-income earners, such as students (participant ingroup), and high-
income/corporate taxpayers (outgroup). The article (a) portraying low power over both 
groups was titled ‘Australian Tax Office impotent against tax cheats: big and small’. It 
referred to the difficulty of tracking large corporate tax evasion due to ‘phoenix 
companies’ (that make losses and declare bankruptcy but re-emerge under different names) 
and the difficulty of detecting undeclared cash-income due to its invisible nature. The 
article (b) portraying high power over the outgroup and low power over the ingroup was 
titled ‘Tax Office fails with small cheats but tough on big players’. It referred to the use of 
a sophisticated database on leading companies to catch corporate money shifting and 
insolvency as well as public shaming of directors involved, and the difficulty of detecting 
undeclared cash-income due to its invisible nature. The article (c) for the reverse condition 
was titled ‘Tax Office tough on small cheats but fails with big players’. It referred to the 
difficulty of tracking large corporate tax evasion due to ‘phoenix companies’ (as described 
above) and data-matching techniques to detect undeclared cash-income. These two 
inconsistent power articles first presented the group towards which the Tax Office had high 
power. The article (d) describing high power over both groups was titled ‘Australian Tax 
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Office tough on tax cheats: big and small’. It referred to the use of a sophisticated database 
on leading companies to catch corporate money shifting and insolvency as well as public 
shaming of the directors involved, and data-matching techniques to detect undeclared 
income. In both consistent power articles the high-income/corporate taxpayers were 
presented first and low/cash-income earners second. 
 
Dependent variables. After having read the newspaper article, participants were asked to 
complete a questionnaire. All variables were measured on 7-point rating scales, ranging 
from 1 (do not agree at all) to 7 (agree completely). 
 
Power. Participants responded to five questions regarding the Tax Office’s power over 
different taxpayer groups: ‘The Tax Office can’t do much if a [large business] decides to 
defy it’ (reverse-scored), and so on for ‘small business’, ‘wealthy wage-earner’, ‘ordinary 
wage-earner’, and ‘cash-wage earner’. The two items regarding the Tax Office’s perceived 
power over large business and wealthy people were averaged for a measure of power over 
the outgroup (r = 0.74). In contrast, the ingroup in the present study were cash-earners. 
Because the cash economy is characteristically also a problem among small businesses 
(Bajada, 2002), the two items regarding the Tax Office’s perceived power over small 
business and cash-earners were averaged for a measure of power over the ingroup             
(r = 0.44). A principal component analysis with varimax rotation for the four items 
confirmed the distinction, yielding two factors (53% explained variance) on which the 
relevant items loaded as expected (loadings > 0.79). The two measures of perceived power 
over ingroup and outgroup were weakly correlated (r = 0.22)  
 
Using all five power items, a measure of power inconsistency was constructed by 
calculating each participant’s standard deviation across the five questions. A smaller 
standard deviation indicates perceived uniformity of treatment toward different groups; 
conversely, a larger standard deviation indicates perceived disparity of treatment towards 
different groups (see Kinsey & Grasmick, 1993; Wenzel, 2002b).  
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Legitimacy. Legitimacy measures were adopted from research by Tyler (1997). The seven 
items tapped into facets such as acceptance of decisions by the tax authority even when 
they are counter to one’s own views or interests (for example, ‘People should follow the 
decisions of the Tax Office even if they go against what they think is right’) or, reverse-
coded, resistance against decisions that are considered wrong (for example, ‘People have a 
duty to resist the Tax Office where they don’t agree with its rules’); favourable evaluations 
of the authority (‘The Tax Office does its job well’) and, reverse-coded, rejection of the 
Tax Office’s authority (for example, ‘The Tax Office’s influence in decisions about our tax 
system should be reduced’). Scale scores were obtained by averaging across items            
( = 0.76). 
 
Identification. The level of identification with the inclusive category was measured on a 
three-item scale: ‘Being a member of the Australian community is very important to me’; 
‘I am proud of being a member of the Australian community’; and ‘I see myself mainly as 
a member of the Australian community’ (α = 0.73). The items measured three facets of the 
social identity: centrality, emotive attachment and salience (see Haslam, 2004). Scale 
scores were obtained by averaging across items (M = 5.32, SD = 1.16). Note that the 
identification scores were rather skewed, reflecting that most respondents identified more 
or less strongly as Australians. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
First, it was checked whether the manipulations succeeded in inducing the intended 
perceptions. The measure of power over ingroup was subjected to an analysis of variance 
with the two experimental factors power over ingroup and power over outgroup. This 
yielded only the expected main effect of power over ingroup, F(1, 102) = 13.68, p < 0.001, 
with power over the ingroup being perceived to be higher in the high than in the low power 
level condition (Ms = 4.83 vs. 3.90). Similarly, for the measure of power over outgroup the 
same analysis yielded only a significant main effect of power over outgroup, F(1, 102) = 
6.75, p = 0.011. The tax authority was perceived to have greater power over the outgroup 
in the high than in the low power over outgroup condition (Ms = 4.94 vs. 4.21). The 
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newspaper articles thus successfully influenced the respondents’ perception of the Tax 
Office’s level of power over ingroup and outgroup. 
 
Of further interest was whether these manipulations also affected perceptions of power 
inconsistency as indicated by the standard deviation measure. Analysis of variance yielded 
only a significant interaction effect as expected, F(1, 102) = 7.40, p = 0.008. The tax 
authority’s power over different taxpayer subgroups was regarded as less inconsistent in 
the conditions where the tax authority was portrayed as having low or high power over 
both groups (Ms = 1.11 and 1.01, respectively) compared to the situations where it had low 
power over the ingroup but high power over the outgroup, or high power over the ingroup 
but low power over the outgroup (Ms = 1.62 and 1.22, respectively). Note that the 
experimental manipulations did not significantly affect levels of identification with the 
inclusive category (Australians), F(1, 102) < 2.67, ns, which is important for it to function 
as a moderator variable, as we will investigate now.  
 
How did the experimental manipulations influence the attribution of legitimacy to the 
authority? We predicted that this would depend on respondents’ level of identification with 
the inclusive category in this context. To test our predictions, we performed hierarchical 
regression analyses with perceived legitimacy of the tax authority as dependent variable. In 
a first step we included the two dummy-coded experimental factors and the identification 
measure as predictor variables. As Table 1 shows, there was a significant effect of 
identification ( = 0.20, p = 0.035) indicating that respondents regarded the tax authority as 
more legitimate, the more they identified with the superordinate group Australians. There 
was also, close to significant, an unexpected effect of power over ingroup ( = 0.19,          
p = 0.052): in the condition of high power over the ingroup respondents tended to ascribe a 
greater level of legitimacy to the authority than in the low power condition. 
 
More interesting for our predictions are interactions between experimental factors and 
identification. To reduce the risk of multicollinearity, we followed Aiken and West (1991) 
and standardised the predictor variables first before building the interaction terms as 
products of the relevant standardised variables. Moreover, for interaction terms that are 
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based on the product of standardised predictor variables the unstandardised solution 
provides an unbiased standardised regression coefficient.  
 
Table 1: Hierarchical regression model of Study 1 
 
Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Identification 0.20* 0.13 0.16 
Power over ingroup 0.19† 0.22* 0.21* 
Power over outgroup 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Identification × Power over ingroup  -0.05 0.04 
Identification × Power over outgroup  -0.23* -0.18† 
Power over ingroup × Power over outgroup  0.09 0.08 
Identification × Power over ingroup ×  
      Power over outgroup 
  0.17† 
(Constant) 0.00 0.01 -0.02 
R2 0.082 0.134 0.159 
∆R2  0.052 0.025 
∆F 3.04* 1.99 2.89† 
df 102 99 98 
 
Note. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted interactions between level of power (over ingroup and outgroup) 
and level of identification. In a second step of the regression, we therefore included all 
three two-way interactions between the predictor variables. As can be seen in Table 1, Step 
2, the only significant two-way interaction was between the factor power over outgroup 
and the identification measure ( = -0.23, p = 0.025). To illustrate the meaning of this 
effect, we calculated simple effects of power over outgroup at –1 and +1 standard 
deviation of identification (Aiken & West, 1991). The results are depicted in Figure 1. In 
line with Hypothesis 1b, the experimentally manipulated level of power over the outgroup 
significantly affected perceptions of legitimacy only when respondents did not identify 
strongly with the inclusive group: the more power the authority was said to have over the 
ingroup, the more legitimate the authority was found ( = 0.33, p = 0.021). In contrast, 
strongly identified respondents attributed relatively high levels of legitimacy to the tax 
authority regardless of its level of power over the outgroup ( = -0.13, ns). However, there 
was no empirical support for Hypothesis 1a, which predicted an equivalent finding for 
power over the ingroup. 
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Figure 1: Interaction between identification and power over outgroup (Study 1). 
 
Note: The standardised simple slopes are depicted here for –1 and +1 standard deviations of each 
predictor variable.  
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that for respondents who identified strongly with the inclusive 
group consistent use of power over ingroup and outgroup (low or high power over both 
groups) would contribute to greater legitimacy. A consistency effect would be reflected in 
a two-way interaction between power over ingroup and power over outgroup. Because 
such an effect was only predicted for the highly identified, this should materialise as a 
three-way interaction effect. The three-way interaction term was therefore included in a 
third step of the regression (see Table 1); it had a marginally significant effect ( = 0.17,   
p = 0.092). To probe the meaning of this effect we tested for simple effects at low and high 
levels of inclusive identification (-1 and +1 standard deviation). The results showed for 
relatively low levels of identification only the significant effect of power over the outgroup 
( = 0.28, p = 0.050) already obtained in the second step of the regression. Crucially, the 
two-way interaction between power over ingroup and power over outgroup was here not 
significant ( = -0.09, ns). In contrast, for more strongly identified respondents, the two-
way interaction between levels of power over ingroup and outgroup was marginally 
significant ( = 0.25, p = 0.067), consistent with Hypotheses 2. Further probing of this 
interaction revealed that high power over the outgroup tended to yield greater legitimacy 
when the authority had high power over the ingroup ( = 0.17, ns), but it led to less 
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legitimacy when it was inconsistent with the authority’s low power over the ingroup         
( = -0.34, p = 0.064). 
 
Because the regression results supporting Hypothesis 2 were only marginally significant 
and somewhat ambiguous so far, a more focused test was conducted to clarify the results. 
For this test, the two experimental factors were recoded into a new factor of power 
consistency. Namely, conditions of low power over ingroup and high power over outgroup 
were combined with high power over ingroup and low power over outgroup as situations 
of inconsistent power use. In contrast, conditions of equally low or high power over both 
groups were combined as situations of consistent power use. A further regression analysis 
included as predictors this new factor power consistency, power over the outgroup, 
identification and the interaction between power consistency and identification. The 
interaction was statistically significant ( = 0.19, p = 0.048). Simple effect analysis showed 
that power consistency had no effect when identification was low ( = -0.12, ns), but it 
significantly affected perceptions of legitimacy when identification was high ( = 0.27,     
p = 0.047). Only when respondents identified strongly with the inclusive category did the 
consistent use of power over ingroup and outgroup lead to attributions of greater 
legitimacy to the authority (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Interaction between identification and power consistency (Study 1). 
 
Note. The standardised simple slopes are depicted here for –1 and +1 standard deviations of each 
predictor variable.  
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The findings of Study 1 thus yielded empirical support for the prediction that for highly 
identified respondents the consistency of power use would foster attributions of legitimacy, 
while those who identify less strongly would be less affected by power consistency. 
Moreover, it was found that respondents who identified less strongly with the inclusive 
group regarded the authority as relatively legitimate only when the authority exerted a high 
degree of power over the outgroup, while the highly identified regarded the authority as 
rather legitimate regardless of power levels over the outgroup. This is in line with the 
prediction that the less identified would be more concerned about the relative favourability 
and instrumentality of the authority’s power use for their subgroup’s interests.  
 
Unexpectedly, however, the corresponding prediction that less identified respondents 
would ascribe greater legitimacy to an authority that had relatively little power over the 
ingroup was not borne out. Interestingly, there was instead a reverse main effect: the 
authority’s greater use of power against the ingroup led to more legitimacy. It is not clear 
why this part of the prediction was not confirmed and why instead respondents seemed to 
ascribe more legitimacy to an authority who was tough on their own group. One possible 
explanation is that the low/cash income group of taxpayers was not as much of an ingroup 
for students as we had assumed. While students do often earn cash on the side, their 
income is usually modest and below the tax-free threshold, so that taxpaying (or tax 
evasion) and the tax authority’s power to prevent noncompliance may not be such big 
issues for them. In a second study, we will therefore turn to a different population, namely 
a broader cross-section of citizens for whom taxpaying and their identity as taxpayers 
should be more relevant.  
 
Study 2 
 
Study 2 applied a correlational survey methodology to test the theoretical predictions for a 
broader population for whom tax issues can be expected to be more topical. The data were 
taken from an extensive survey of Australian citizens conducted in 2002/2003. Because in 
this study respondents belonged to a variety of taxpayer groups, we could not refer to a 
particular ingroup and outgroup. Instead, we used the more generic labels ‘their own 
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occupational group’ and ‘other occupational groups’ and basically invited respondents to 
nominate or think of the relevant ingroup and outgroup. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and procedure 
 
A sample of 4000 respondents was drawn from the Australian electoral roll, using 
proportional-to-size sampling within each state and territory. Respondents were first sent a 
pre-letter asking them for their participation in a survey on tax issues and guaranteeing 
strict confidentiality of responses. Unless participation had explicitly been declined, 
respondents were then sent a survey with reply-paid envelope. The following process was 
modelled on the Dillman Total Design Method (Dillman, 1978) and involved the follow-up 
of non-respondents over a period of time, sending them reminder letters and replacement 
surveys. In total, 965 completed surveys were finally received. When adjusting for out-of-
scope respondents, this corresponds to a response rate of 29.4%. The relatively low 
response rate was likely to be due to the considerable length of the survey and the 
unattractive tax topic, but it is consistent with other tax surveys of the general population in 
Australia (Braithwaite, Reinhart, Mearns, & Graham, 2001; Wallschutzky, 1984).  
 
The final total sample was between 18 and 88 years old (M = 48.5); 54.2% were male and 
45.8% were female; 52.5% had post-secondary education; 67.6% worked full-time and 
25.8% worked part-time; the average personal income was about AUS$ 36 000. Note that 
further reductions of the valid n in the following analyses were due to missing data. 
 
Variables  
 
Identification. The level of identification with the inclusive category was measured on a 
three-item scale under the heading ‘Where do you position yourself within the tax system?’ 
First, ‘When you think about tax, do you see yourself primarily …’ with different options 
following, one of them being ‘As a member of the Australian community’. Second, ‘What 
is important to you? … The Australian community’. Third, ‘What do you feel pride in? … 
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Being a member of the Australian community’ (all on 7-point scales, from 1 = not at all, to 
7 = very much). Scale scores were obtained by averaging across items ( = 0.79).  
 
Power. As a measure of the level of power over the ingroup, a single item was used that 
adopted the format from Study 1: ‘The Tax Office can’t do much if my occupational group 
decides to defy it’ (reverse-scored; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). A similar 
one-item measure was used for the perceived level of power over the outgroup: ‘The Tax 
Office can’t do much if other occupational groups decide to defy it’ (reverse-scored).  
 
Power consistency. Another five items that again followed the same format were used to 
measure power consistency across societal groups: ‘The Tax Office can’t do much if [large 
business] decides to defy it’, and so on for ‘small business’, ‘a wealthy person’, ‘an 
ordinary wage and salary earner’ and ‘a self-employed taxpayer’. In line with the 
procedure used in Study 1, respondents’ individual standard deviations across these items 
were calculated. A smaller standard deviation indicates perceived uniformity or 
consistency of treatment toward different groups, while a larger standard deviation 
indicates perceived disparity of treatment towards different groups. To reverse this 
measure and score it in the direction of the construct (consistent with the hypothesis), it 
was multiplied by –1.  
 
Legitimacy. Legitimacy was measured by nine items that tapped into the perceived fairness 
of the Tax Office (for example, ‘Our tax system is fair’), the Tax Office representing 
Australian norms and values (for example, ‘The Tax Office is an institution that represents 
what the Australian people believe in’) as well as favouribility toward and trust in the tax 
authority (for example, ‘The Tax Office can be trusted to administer the tax system so that 
it is right for the country as a whole’). Scale scores were obtained by averaging across 
items ( = 0.91).  
 
Background variables. A number of background variables were measured: age, sex, 
personal income, family income and education level. All of these were tested for possible 
effects on perceived legitimacy. However, only age turned out to have a significant impact 
that thus needed to be accounted for statistically. All other variables were dropped so as to 
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avoid further reductions in valid cases due to missing data (in particular on the sensitive 
income measures).  
 
Results and discussion 
 
The descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for all variables are displayed in Table 
2. Note that measures of power over ingroup and power over outgroup were strongly 
positively correlated (r = 0.71). This correlation was unexpected and constitutes a potential 
problem for the following regression analyses. Tolerance statistics and condition indices 
indicated that multicollinearity was not a problem, but the considerable overlap between 
these two variables could imply mutual inhibition of their effects, which was to be 
considered in our analyses (see Cohen, Cohen, West, Aiken, 2003). We will return to this 
issue. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations for Study 2 
 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Age 47.82 14.42 —      
2. Identification 5.55 1.26 -0.14*** —     
3. Power over ingroup 5.55 1.47 -0.02 -0.00 —    
4. Power over outgroup 5.22 1.51 -0.04 -0.03 -0.71*** —   
5. Power consistency -1.32 1.06 -0.14*** -0.08* -0.07† -0.12*** —  
6. Legitimacy 3.53 1.16 -0.13*** -0.20*** -0.11*** -0.06† 0.21*** —
 
Note. Listwise N = 846. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
To test our theoretical predictions, hierarchical regression analyses were employed, with 
legitimacy being the criterion variable. In a first step, we controlled for age as a 
background variable (the other background variables played no significant role and were 
dropped). In a second step, all first-order effects were included in the analysis; that is, 
identification, power over ingroup, power over outgroup and power consistency were 
included as predictor variables. In a third step, three two-way interaction terms were 
included, namely interactions between identification on the one hand, and power over 
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ingroup, power over outgroup and power consistency on the other hand. Predictors were 
again first standardised and interaction terms were the product of relevant standardised 
variables; the unstandardised solution provides then appropriate standardised regression 
coefficients (Aiken & West, 1991). 
 
The results of the regression analysis are given in Table 3. All three steps of the regression 
contributed to the explanation of variance in perceived legitimacy. We can focus on the 
last step of the model. First, even if of little theoretical interest here, age was significantly 
related to perceived legitimacy ( = 0.14, p < 0.001). Older respondents tended to attribute 
greater legitimacy to the tax authority than younger respondents did. Controlling for this 
effect, level of identification was positively related to perceived legitimacy ( = 0.19,        
p < 0.001). The more strongly respondents identified with their nation, being the relevant 
inclusive category in this context, the more legitimacy they ascribed to the tax authority. 
This is consistent with a self-categorisation analysis of group commitment and leadership 
(Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), according to which group members 
hold more favourable attitudes to others who are fellow members or represent a group with 
which they identify in a given situation. 
 
Table 3: Hierarchical regression model of Study 2 
 
Predictor Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Age 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
Identification  0.20*** 0.19*** 
Power over ingroup  -0.06 -0.09† 
Power over outgroup  -0.06 -0.05 
Power consistency  0.24*** 0.23*** 
Identification × Power over ingroup   0.09* 
Identification × Power over outgroup   -0.05 
Identification × Power consistency   0.06* 
(Constant) 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
R2 0.017 0.118 0.124 
∆R2  0.100 0.007 
∆F 14.99*** 23.84*** 2.17† 
df 844 840 837 
 
Note. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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More important for the present approach, there was a marginally significant effect of 
power over the ingroup, which tended to be negatively related to perceived legitimacy      
( = -.09, p = 0.080). Consistent with the findings of Ellemers et al. (1998), people 
generally dislike being subjected to power. Leaders or institutions using power may do so 
at the expense of a decrease in legitimacy that affected subordinates or subgroups attribute 
to them. Moreover, power consistency was positively related to perceived legitimacy       
( = 0.23, p = < 0.001). People are generally concerned about the fair and consistent use of 
power. When powerholders use different amounts of power over various groups, their 
authority is regarded as less legitimate.  
 
However, these effects need to be considered in the context of significant interaction 
effects that are central to our theoretical predictions. First, level of identification 
significantly moderated the relationship between level of power over the ingroup and 
perceived legitimacy ( = 0.09, p = 0.048). Simple slopes, calculated at levels of –1 versus 
+1 standard deviations of identification, were used to illustrate the meaning of this 
interaction (Aiken & West, 1991). The results were consistent with Hypothesis 1a. For less 
identified respondents, power over the ingroup was significantly negatively related to 
legitimacy ( = -0.18, p = 0.017). The more power the authority had or used against the 
ingroup, the less legitimate the authority was perceived to be. In contrast, for highly 
identified respondents, power over the ingroup had no significant effect ( = 0.01, ns). As 
can be seen in Figure 3, these respondents considered the tax authority to be relatively 
legitimate, irrespective of the level of power used against the ingroup. 
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Figure 3. Interaction between identification and power over ingroup (Study 2). 
 
Note. The standardised simple slopes are depicted here for –1 and +1 standard deviations of each 
predictor variable.  
 
For power over the outgroup, the equivalent interaction effect predicted in Hypothesis 1b 
was not significant. As noted before, power over the outgroup (and its interaction with 
identification) could lack significance because of the observed strong overlap with power 
over the ingroup. To investigate this possibility, an alternative regression model was 
analysed where power over the ingroup and its interaction were omitted. Again, however, 
the interaction between power over outgroup and identification was not significant. 
Moreover, power over the outgroup was now significantly negatively related to perceived 
legitimacy ( = -0.12, p < 0.001). From our perspective, and following Study 1, a high 
level of power used against an outgroup to maintain its compliance should rather have been 
conducive to perceptions of legitimacy. This suggests that the power over the outgroup 
measure was problematic in this study. In retrospect, other ‘occupational groups’, as 
referred to in this measure, might not necessarily be regarded as outgroups in this context. 
Respondents may have thought of other groups of workers or wage earners (that is, 
occupation in a more narrow sense) that might have been regarded less as outgroups 
compared to business groups and wealthy people.  
 
Finally, our analysis yielded a significant interaction effect of power consistency and 
identification ( = 0.06, p = 0.049). Again, simple slopes illustrate the meaning of this 
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interaction, calculated at levels of –1 versus +1 standard deviations of identification. For 
less identified respondents, power consistency was already positively related to perceived 
legitimacy ( = 0.17, p < 0.001), but the relationship was substantially stronger for highly 
identified respondents ( = 0.29, p < 0.001). As can be seen in Figure 4, consistency of 
power use contributed greatly to the authority’s legitimacy as perceived by respondents 
who identified strongly with the inclusive category. The benefits of consistent power use 
were less pronounced for respondents who identified less strongly with the inclusive 
category. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 2 and the results of Study 1. 
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Figure 4. Interaction between identification and power consistency (Study 2). 
 
Note. The standardised simple slopes are depicted here for –1 and +1 standard deviations of each 
predictor variable.  
 
General discussion 
 
The present two studies investigated how an authority’s power use affect perceptions of its 
legitimacy. Specifically, we focused on regulatory institutions that are given powers to 
maintain people’s compliance with principles, rules or laws. We argued that, different from 
earlier treatments of the concept of power, a power relationship is often a multilateral one, 
where one authority wields power over a number of subordinates or various groups of 
people. In this situation, people may not only be concerned about the level of power the 
authority uses against themselves or their ingroup, but also whether it is powerful enough 
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towards others and relevant outgroups. Moreover, it raises the issue of fairness and 
consistency of power use across ingroup and outgroups.  
 
We argued that people’s level of identification with a superordinate category that includes 
ingroup, outgroup and authority determines how these issues affect perceptions of 
legitimacy. Overall, the two studies, set in the context of taxation, yielded good support for 
the theoretical analysis. Consistent with earlier studies (Ellemers et al., 1998; Haslam et al., 
1999), high identifiers were less affected by the level of power the authority used and they 
ascribed high levels of legitimacy regardless. Being highly identified with the inclusive 
category, they are more likely to see the tax authority as representative of themselves and 
as a legitimate authority. In contrast, the less identified base their views more on the 
implications of the authority’s power use for their own subgroup in relation to other 
subgroups. They prefer that the authority is tough on an outgroup that attempts to 
undermine the law and take advantage of others, as observed in Study 1. Or, they prefer 
that the authority is lenient to their ingroup and they are more favourable to the authority in 
this case, as shown in Study 2.  
 
It is not completely clear why it was power over the outgroup that showed the predicted 
effects in the first study, but power over the ingroup in the second study. We have already 
hinted at some possible post-hoc explanations. Both have to do with assumptions that we 
made in the design of our study about which groups would be relevant ingroups or 
outgroups. For students in the first study, cash earning taxpayers might not have been such 
a relevant ingroup, because many students do not pay any tax (even though they have to 
lodge a tax return for the money they earn part-time). However, it should be pointed out 
that the student participants in the experimental study were not merely a sample of 
convenience. Rather, it was integral to the success of the manipulation that participants 
were uninformed enough so as not to question the validity of the information they were 
given. Unfortunately, relatively uninformed might also have meant relatively uninvolved 
and unidentified with the ingroup presented. In the second study, ‘other occupational 
groups’ might not have been regarded as a relevant outgroup. Respondents might have 
understood this category in a narrow sense of the word occupation and perhaps thought of 
others with whom they shared a tax-relevant identity as workers or professionals. 
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Basically, the question referring to other occupational groups might have made them think 
of other ingroup members rather than outgroup members. 
 
Other differences between the two studies could also account for the different findings. For 
example, it should be noted that the measure of legitimacy in Study 2 used somewhat 
different items compared to Study 1. This had to do with the fact that the data were taken 
from a larger survey that was not explicitly designed to replicate Study 1. While both 
measures can be considered reasonable operationalisations of legitimacy, consistent with 
the way this construct has been measured elsewhere (see Tyler, 1997), the possibility of 
unintended shifts in meaning cannot be completely ruled out. Yet, it is not clear what these 
shifts could have been and how they could account for the different findings. 
 
To continue the discussion of limitations of this research, we have already mentioned 
earlier the omission of measures of subgroup identification in these studies. Theoretically, 
concerns about power over ingroup and power consistency over ingroup and outgroup 
should be greater when people actually identify with their ingroup. It is not clear whether 
cash-earners was a relevant ingroup for student respondents in Study 1, and whether one’s 
occupational group was the relevant ingroup for respondents in Study 2 (although the 
results are consistent with such an interpretation). Another limitation stems from the fact 
that superordinate identification was an observed variable in both studies. We therefore 
cannot be certain about the causality underlying the effects, even in the experimental study. 
Because level of identification might be correlated with other relevant respondent 
differences that were not taken into account in these studies, such third variables could also 
account for the effects.  
 
However, the two studies also have some clear strengths and complement each other well. 
The studies used different samples of participants and different methodological 
approaches, a controlled experimental design versus a rich field study, and yet they yielded 
results that were consistent at a theoretical level. 
 
The most consistent finding, at a theoretical as well as observational level, was that 
inclusive identification also affected concerns about the consistency of power use. Here, it 
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is the highly identified who have greater concerns about consistency and fairness; they are 
negatively affected and withdraw legitimacy when the authority uses power inconsistently. 
This finding is in line with a social identity analysis of justice and fairness, such as Tyler’s 
(1997) group value model of procedural justice and Wenzel’s (2004) categorisation 
approach to distributive justice. People judge an authority’s use of power in terms of 
justice and fairness when they identify with an inclusive category (formally) represented 
by the authority; when they care about the values that define that identity as they see it, and 
when they are concerned about their ingroup’s status in the context of that overarching 
identity.  
 
More specifically, the findings are consistent with Tyler and Lind’s (1992) relational 
model of authority that assumes that people attribute legitimate authority to leaders or 
representatives of their group, when they identify with the group and feel that the leaders 
treat them fairly and respectfully. However, whereas it has usually been argued that leaders 
or authorities can do their job either through legitimacy and influence or the exercise of 
power and control, the present research shows that the two are interrelated. When people 
consider the exercise of power appropriate or fair, they attribute greater legitimacy to the 
authority. When they do not identify with the relevant inclusive category, they are more 
likely to find the use of less power over their ingroup, or the use of greater powers against 
the outgroup, appropriate. When they identify with the relevant inclusive category, they are 
more likely to transcend their immediate subgroup interests and find a consistent use of 
power over both groups fair and legitimate. 
 
The findings can also be related to Platow’s work on the effects of a leader’s resource 
allocations and perceived distributive fairness on leadership endorsement (Platow, Hoar, 
Reid, Harley, & Morrison, 1997; Platow, O’Connell, Shave, & Hanning, 1995). In 
interpersonal (intragroup) contexts, the research showed that participants found an equal 
allocation fairer and endorsed a leader more who allocated resources equally. In 
comparison, in intergroup contexts, members who identified strongly with their group 
tended to find fairer an allocation that favoured an ingroup member at the expense of an 
outgroup member, and they endorsed more strongly a leader who distributed the resources 
in favour of the ingroup. Platow, Reid and Andrew (1998) replicated these findings for 
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equal versus unequal amount of voice given to participants, that is, for an aspect of 
procedural justice (see Platow, Wenzel, & Nolan, 2003).  
 
Although Platow’s work does not involve the issue of superordinate identification, there is 
an interesting parallel to the present research. In Platow’s studies, the interpersonal context 
(and the intergroup context for participants who did not identify with their ingroup) may be 
construed as an intragroup situation similar to the condition in the present research where 
participants identified with the inclusive category. In these conditions, both studies 
demonstrated support for leaders/authorities who treated people equally and consistently. 
In contrast, the intergroup context for the highly identified ingroup members in Platow’s 
studies, and the situation where participants did not identify with the inclusive category in 
the present research, yielded support for leaders/authorities who were biased in favour of 
the ingroup or against the outgroup. Clearly, the present study differs from the earlier 
research in its interest in regulatory institutions rather than single leaders, and in its focus 
on groups rather than single members as subordinates. Nonetheless, the parallel is 
interesting and suggests that Platow’s analysis could also be applied to the use and 
distribution of power in a tripartite power relation.  
 
The present study, however, points explicitly to the importance of inclusion for the 
attribution of legitimacy; such an inclusion can even span an intergroup context (Huo, 
2003). A sense of inclusion is the basis for a commitment to justice as well as the 
derivation of specific entitlements (Wenzel, 2002a). When people identify with the 
inclusive category, they use criteria of justice to evaluate an authority’s use of power or its 
relative powerlessness, and they attribute degrees of legitimacy correspondingly. When 
people do not identify with the inclusive category, they base their evaluations on their 
perceived self or group-interests and on how instrumental the authority’s power position is 
for these. Put differently, authorities can gain legitimacy when they encourage 
commitment to a superordinate identity and common values and when they use power 
consistently.  
 
At one level, this conclusion is in line with Tyler’s (2001) view about the role of fairness in 
garnering legitimacy as an effective means to compliance. At another level, it implies 
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however that the use of power is not necessarily inconsistent with legitimacy, and 
legitimacy not simply an alternative to power. Rather, people may in fact expect an 
authority to have and use power rather than being a ‘toothless tiger’ (the main effect of 
power over the ingroup in Study 1 provides some evidence for this). To have credibility 
and legitimacy, authorities may need power, for instance, to prevent that compliant 
taxpayers feel tax evaders are exploiting them and are getting away with it. However, 
authorities need to use their power appropriately and consistently, in order to maintain their 
legitimacy. Note that this does not necessarily mean that authorities cannot regulate 
responsively and with discretion, using differently coercive and cooperative strategies 
depending on the circumstances (Braithwaite, 2002). It is important however that soft 
cooperative compliance strategies are not seen to be used for some groups but not for 
others, simply because the authority has unequal amounts of coercive power over them or 
is unwilling to use its power against some but not other groups. The authority would need 
to reasonably explain and justify its choices (Sparrow, 2000). 
 
In fact, what we may need to distinguish in future research are the attributions for an 
authority’s differential power use towards ingroup and outgroup. A regulatory institution 
such as the Tax Office may use less power and be less effective towards a subgroup of 
taxpayers, because it does not have the means to be more effective or because it lacks 
commitment to fight the noncompliance of that group. Whatever is actually the case, it is 
crucial how taxpayer groups perceive the situation and explain the authority’s differential 
power use. For instance, ordinary taxpayers may think the tax authority simply does not 
have the means to always foresee the loopholes that wealthy individuals or large corporates 
will exploit next; that it does not have the funds or the personnel to match the sophisticated 
legal advice that wealthy taxpayers can engage. Alternatively, ordinary taxpayers may 
believe that the tax authority has the capacity to stem tax evasion and avoidance of the 
wealthy and large business but decides not to make use of it. For instance, they may 
believe the tax authority tolerates tax avoidance schemes of the wealthy, but intervenes 
when the same schemes are adopted by ordinary taxpayers (Hobson, 2002; Murphy, 2002). 
In line with Mikula’s (1993, 2003) attribution of blame model, we would expect that 
taxpayers’ explanations of the tax authority’s actions determine how much responsibility 
and blame they attribute to the authority, and how much injustice and resentment they feel. 
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While more work needs to be done, the present research clarified that power use and 
legitimacy are not necessarily opposites. In a tripartite relationship between ingroup, 
outgroup and authority, a commitment to an overarching inclusive identity can make 
consistent and fair power use a basis of legitimacy.  
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